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ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
DOES PETALUMA LIE AT THE END OF THE
ROAD FROM RAMAPO?
R. MARLIN SMITHt
THERE is no neat, simple answer to the question as to whether
environmental controls serve to guide or block land development.
They can do either. If our only concern were to be alert for unworthy,
exclusionary land use practices disguised as environmental concerns,
the problem would not be nearly so difficult. But, increasingly, we
must expect that, where environmental issues are concerned, compet-
ing public interests will tug us in different directions.
At the outset, the issues seemed so simple because everyone was
in favor of clean air and pure water. It was only as actual cases
developed that the conflicting bundle of policy considerations which
underlay environmental objectives was exposed. A specific example
will illustrate the problem: There would be general agreement that
the protection of valuable natural resources such as coastal wetlands
and the fish and wildlife that inhabit those areas is rightfully an im-
portant objective of environmental policy. However, the creation of
thousands of new jobs for the unemployed and underemployed, especi-
ally when many of those jobs will be filled by members of a community
suffering from chronic unemployment, is an equally important public
policy objective. One would suppose that these two objectives could
never collide. Yet they did, and the conflict produced strange an-
tagonists: the Florida Audubon Society on one side against the Urban
League and the NAACP on the other.
At issue in Florida Audubon Society v. Callaway,' recently de-
cided by a federal district court in Florida, was the fate of Blount
Island, a small man-made island in the St. John's River near Jackson-
ville, 10 miles from the Atlantic Ocean. More specifically, the issue
was whether the defendant, Secretary of the Army Callaway, should
issue a permit allowing the Jacksonville Port Authority to dredge
and fill certain areas around and on Blount Island, thus making
it feasible for Offshore Power Systems, Inc. to develop the island
as a site for the manufacture of floating nuclear power plants. The
Audubon Society, concerned with protecting the natural environment
of Blount Island, sought to enjoin Secretary Callaway from issuing
the permit because of alleged deficiencies in the environmental impact
t Member of the Illinois Bar; B.A., Carleton College, 1951; J.D., University of
Chicago, 1956.
1. Civil No. 73-824 (M.D. Fla., Jan. 29, 1974) (copy on file at the Villanova
Law Review).
MAY 19741
1
Smith: Does Petaluma Lie at the End of the Road From Ramapo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
statement filed by the Corps of Engineers. On the opposing side as
intervenors were the Jacksonville Urban League and the NAACP,
among others, who wanted Offshore Power Systems to build its plant
because it would employ 10,000 to 12,000 people, 90 per cent of
whom would be from the Jacksonville area and at least 23 per cent
of whom would be drawn from minority groups. The case raised
technical objections to the environmental impact statement, all of
which the court rejected. Although it was not necessary for the
court to weigh the merits of protecting fish, birds, and small mammals
against the desirability of providing jobs for unemployed or under-
employed persons, this unstated issue still pervaded the case. Which
is more important: scarce species of wildlife or the dignity of decent,
full-time employment for the jobless? Fortunately, in Florida Audubon
Society these objectives were not mutually exclusive - there was
ample marsh and wetland left in the St. John's Estuary for the finned,
feathered, and furred creatures. However, had this not been the case,
then a conscious choice would have been necessary.
Another case which involved competing values was In re Spring
Valley Development,2 which upheld the Maine Site Location of Develop-
ment Law.' The statute applied to certain types of commercial or
industrial development, and the court held that this included all resi-
dential developments over 20 acres.4 The Maine legislature had
wanted to ensure that the types of development specified in the statute
would be "located in a manner [having] a minimal adverse impact
on the natural environment of their surroundings."' The Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine interpreted the statute and concluded that
[t]he language of the Act and its clear underlying purpose
reflect the Legislature's intention that a development with a par-
ticular propensity to damage the environment should not be
located in areas where the environment is particularly incapable
of sustaining the impact without public injury.6
The "minimal impact" standard seems to be an absolute one. It leaves
no room for a comparison of the benefits to be gained from competing
public needs and objectives. If there is more than a "minimal impact"
on the environment, development may not take place. The Maine Site
Location of Development Law was passed, in part, in apprehension
of the pollution of the Maine coastline that might occur if its harbors
2. 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
3. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-88 (Supp. 1973).
4. 300 A.2d at 746.
5. Id. at 745, quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 481 (Supp. 1973) (emphasis
of the court omitted).
6. Id.
740 [VOL. 19: p. 703
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were used as deepwater ports for oil tankers and the inevitable, at-
tendant storage tanks were built on shore. In the light of the current
national petroleum shortage, the policy conflict becomes acute. Must
the motor fuel needs of the thousands of persons dependent upon pe-
troleum products for transportation be secured at the cost of an ex-
tensive adverse environmental impact upon valuable natural assets?
While the conflicting policies may not always be as dramatic or
obvious, there are equally clear conflicts between the public objectives
created by environmental concerns and the national need to provide
new housing for both the expanding population and the large percent-
age of our population that is still ill-housed. Parochial ordinances dic-
tated by the inhabitants of exclusive suburban fiefdoms too frequently
prevent the construction of new housing in the metropolitan surburbs.
It has been little more than 10 years since persons concerned
with providing an ample supply of decent housing for those of low
or modest incomes discovered that zoning laws and subdivision and
building codes were being utilized to prevent the construction of
multiple-family housing in the suburban ring.7 However, exclusionary
land use devices have been yielding rapidly to attacks both in the
federal courts, where they have been deemed racially discriminatory,'
and in the state courts, where they have been found to be economically
discriminatory in restricting access to the suburbs to the affluent by
increasing housing costs or by preventing the construction of less
expensive forms of housing such as apartments." In Pennsylvania,
National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn1" held that municipalities
could not use the cost of new public services as a justification for ex-
cluding new housing. In Appeal of Girsh"- and Appeal of Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc.,2 this concept was broadened to impose a public respon-
sibility upon suburban communities to accept their share of the burden
of providing new housing.
Just when the defenders of exclusion seemed to have been routed,
a new weapon was found: they began to denounce urban sprawl as
destroying the quality of the environment. All of the arguments for
clean air, pure water, and protection of countryside amenities were
7. See, e.g., Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom,
111 U. PA. L. REv. 1040 (1963).
8. See, e.g., Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970) ; Sisters
of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971) ; Kennedy Park
Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d
108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
9. See, e.g., Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322
(1971); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 119
N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465, certification granted, 62 N.J. 190, 299 A.2d 724 (1972).
10. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
11. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
12. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
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quickly transformed into arguments for limiting or prohibiting the
construction of new housing.
The most sophisticated approach was the ordinance adopted in
Ramapo, New York. It should be noted in fairness to its authors
that they insist their scheme was not intended to be exclusionary. The
Ramapo growth control ordinance was preceded by four volumes of
comprehensive planning studies which were implemented by a master
plan and a comprehensive zoning ordinance. Additional drainage and
sewage studies were followed by a capital budget providing for the
6-year development of the improvements specified in the master plan.
A capital program provided for the location and sequence of addi-
tional capital improvements in the 12 years following the period
covered by the capital budget. No permit for residential development
would be issued unless the proposed development accumulated 15
points on a sliding scale of values assigned to each of five essential
facilities or services: (1) public sanitary sewers or approved substi-
tutes; (2) drainage facilities; (3) public parks or other recreational
facilities, including public schools; (4) roads and highways; and (5)
firehouses. 3
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Ramapo ordinance,
but not without expressing distinct uneasiness.
There is, then, something inherently suspect in a scheme
which, apart from its professed purposes, effects a restriction
upon the free mobility of a people until sometime in the future
when projected facilities are available to meet increased demands.
Although zoning must include schemes designed to allow munici-
palities to more effectively contend with the increased demands
of evolving and growing communities, under its guise, townships
have been wont to try their hand at an array of exclusionary de-
vices in the hope of avoiding the very burden which growth must
inevitably bring."4
The uneasiness over the obvious opportunities for abuse in the Ramapo
plan led the court to issue a warning:
What we will not countenance, then, under any guise, is
community efforts at immunization or exclusion. ...
While even the best of plans may not always be realized,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, we must assume the Town
will put its best effort forward in implementing the physical and
fiscal timetable outlined under the plan. Should subsequent events
13. Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 366-68, 285
N.E.2d 291, 294-95 (1972).
14. Id. at 375, 285 N.E.2d at 300 (citations omitted).
[VOL. 19: p. 703
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prove this assumption unwarranted, or should the Town because
of some unforeseen event fail in its primary obligation to these
landowners, there will be ample opportunity to undo the restric-
tions upon default. For the present, at least, we are constrained
to proceed upon the assumption that the program will be fully
and timely implemented. 15
Suddenly, "phased growth," "sequential development timing,"
and "growth control" entered the environmental lexicon, and com-
munities all over the land hastened to emulate the Ramapo example.
However benign the intentions of the prophets of phased growth might
have been, their disciples quickly got out of hand. It immediately
became obvious that, in addition to controlling and phasing growth,
such techniques could be used to retard or stop growth altogether,
despite National Land and the warnings in Ramapo."8
Deferring for a moment a discussion of the more fundamental
problems raised by Ramapo-type ordinances, a special problem has
arisen because many of the communities that have attempted to place
limits on growth failed to lay their planning groundwork carefully.
There have been many hastily enacted ordinances that litigation has
shown to be supported by little or no knowledge about the ability of
the community to support growth.
In Palm Beach, Florida, a comprehensive plan's restrictive down-
zoning of the only portion of the community with substantial develop-
able land was based on population projections that a trial court
described as at least 100 percent incorrectY In Largo, Florida, after
years of scrambling for annexations and pursuing growth as "progress,"
the town council, in response to public clamor, downzoned the one
large tract available for multiple-family development only 32 years
after approving a high-rise development for the same site.1la The trial
judge observed:
The record makes it clear as spring water that the zoning
classification adopted at the May 3, 1972, meeting was not based
upon factual consideration, but, to the contrary, was taken over
the recommendation of the town's own planning consultant. Pat-
ently, the Town Commission was not relying upon what was best
15. Id. at 378, 382, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 304 (citations omitted).
16. See Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights
of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 234 (1973).
17. First Bank of Boca Raton v. Town of Palm Beach, No. 70 C 3415 (Cir. Ct.,
Palm Beach County, Fla., Apr. 27, 1972), rev'd for mootness, 298 So. 2d 443 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (copy on file at the Villanova Law Review). For a companion
case, see Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
17a. Imperial Homes v. Town of Largo, Civil No. 37,160 (Cir. Ct., Pinellas
County, Fla., Aug. 1, 1973) (copy on file at the Villanova Law Review).
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for zoning, but was simply reacting to the pressure from dis-
gruntled property owners."'
In Boca Raton, Florida, voters approved a referendum setting a
housing limit of 40,000 dwelling units, thus placing a ceiling of about
100,000 on the town population. No planning preceded this "density
cap"; it was placed on the ballot by a citizens' petition. Fourteen
months after the ceiling went into effect, and despite a moratorium
on the construction of multiple-family dwellings, there had been a
40 percent increase in population."9 Camarillo, California, approved
a master plan for 1150 acres, and then, 3 years later, after the de-
veloper had over $15 million invested in the project, the city imposed
a moratorium in order to study whether the over-all density should
be reduced from five dwelling units per acre to one dwelling unit on
each 5 acres.20 In Boulder, Colorado, an effort was made to use
municipal control over the extension of water service into unincor-
porated areas of the county to determine the pace and timing of growth.
A Colorado court has now held that although the Boulder interim
growth policy is constitutional and does not offend a federally pro-
tected right to travel, its growth control policies may not be used to
select which developments the city will serve with water and which
it will not.2
1
The ultimate absurdity came in Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners
Association v. Lynn22 in which plaintiffs, in an attempt to prevent
acquisition of sites for court-ordered housing, alleged that poor people
and their housing were pollutants that would adversely affect the en-
vironment. Plaintiffs claimed the National Environment Policy Act of
1969 required an environmental impact statement on public housing.
In support of this position, the plaintiffs allege that they are
members of the "middle class and/or working class" which em-
phasizes obedience and respect for lawful authority, has a much
lower propensity toward criminal behavior and acts of physical
violence, and possesses a high regard for the physical and aes-
thetic improvement of real and personal property. The plaintiffs
further allege that, as a "statistical whole" tenants of public hous-
ing possess a higher propensity toward criminal behavior and
acts of physical violence, a disregard for the physical and aes-
thetic maintenance of real and personal property, and a lower
18. Id. at 7.
19. 2 LAND USE PLAN. REP., No. 1 (Jan. 14, 1974), at 10.
20. See Complaint at 11-15, Pardee Constr. Co. v. City of Camarillo, No. 56637
(Super. Ct. of Cal., County of Ventura, filed Feb. 19, 1974) (copy on file at the
2ill1ova Law Review).
21. Robinson v. City of Boulder, Civil No. 72-2033-1 (Dist. Ct., County of
Boulder, Col,, May 20, 1974) (copy on file at the Villanova Law Review).
22. 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973);
[VOL. 19 : p. 703
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commitment to hard work. Therefore, so -the plaintiffs insist,
the construction of public housing will increase the hazards of
criminal acts, physical violence, and aesthetic and economic de-
cline in the immediate vicinity of the sites. The plaintiffs main-
tain that these factors will have a direct adverse impact upon the
physical safety of the plaintiffs residing in close proximity to the
sites, together with a direct adverse impact upon the aesthetic
and economic quality of their lives. 23
One of the most controversial of the new growth control ordi-
nances was adopted by Petaluma, California. After experiencing in-
creasingly rapid growth in the 1960's, Petaluma imposed a temporary
building moratorium in 1971. In August, 1972, Petaluma unveiled
its new Residential Development Control System. The new ordinance
limited to 500 the number of dwelling units that could be built in any
1 year between 1972 and 1977. Half of the 500 units had to be single-
family dwellings, half multiple-family dwellings. In addition, 300 of
the units had to be built in the western, or older, portion of Petaluma,
leaving only 200 that could be built in the eastern portion of town
where most of the recent construction had taken place. Having estab-
lished its quota system, Petaluma did not leave the question of which
dwellings would be built first to the vagaries of "first come, first
served." Instead, it provided for an annual competition among all
builders who hoped to build in Petaluma during the coming year. A
partisan of this bizarre quota system described the procedure:
The competition takes place once a year. By September of
last year, anyone who hoped to build more than four units in the
coming building season had to file plans with a special "residential
development evaluation board" (made up of elected officials, ap-
pointed officials of the city and four school districts, and citizens).
With the plans before it, the board first rejected any proposal
which did not fit the city's general plan and its environmental
design plan. (A developer can ask the city council to amend these
basic documents beforehand.) The remaining proposals were
rated by an elaborate two-part point system. A plan could be
assigned up to 30 points for access to existing and adequate serv-
ices: sewer mains, drainage channels, fire protection, streets and
schools. Another 80 points could be awarded for excellence of
design, for the provision of open space and trial links, and for the
inclusion of lowcost housing and needed public facilities. Any de-
velopment failing to get a minimum number of points (25 out of
30 in the first group, 50 out of 80 in the second) was dropped.24
23. Id. at 148-49.
24. Hart, The Petaluma Case, 9 CRY CALIFORNIA, No. 2 (Spring 1974), at 6-9.
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After a public hearing, the review board's recommendations would be
passed to the city council which would make the final decision as to
which 500 dwelling units would be built.
It is not altogether clear that concern over growth was the sole
wellspring of the Petaluma plan. There was a distinct measure of
concern for the visual aesthetics of new construction underlying the
Petaluma regulations:
The "new" Petaluma, seen from the freeway, from the fields
which remain outside or from its own streets, is depressing, even
appalling. Its houses, perhaps not quite uniform, yet implacably
alike, are set back a standard distance in small lots along enormous
asphalt boulevards incongruously called "lanes." In its flatness
and sameness, the area seems larger than it really is: a whole
horizon of low brown roofs. It is to the landscape of the city
what a clearcut is to the forest.2 5
In Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma,6 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held that Petaluma's growth control ordinance violated the federal
constitutional right of persons to travel and settle freely. At the time
of his decision, Judge Burke stated:
[F]or the purpose of this case, at this stage I must find that the
basic constitutional rule is that no city can regulate its population
growth numerically so as to preclude residents of any other area
from traveling into the region and establishing residence therein.
By its announced policy in the application of that policy the
City of Petaluma violates the constitutional right to travel as in-
dicated. I use the word "travel" in general fashion to include
travel for the purpose of residence either temporarily or on a
permanent basis.
The relief which the plaintiffs are entitled to will consist of
an order that the City through its responsible officers must evalu-
ate all future building applications without regard to any policy
intended to regulate population growth numerically. Quite obvi-
ously this is not designed to preclude the application of other
considerations in these matters.
The ruling is not intended to mean that Petaluma may not
evaluate building applications based upon traditional zoning and
community planning considerations. This, of course, does not
include a consideration of numerical growth.2
25. Id. at 8.
26. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
27. Reporter's Partial Transcript at 4, Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of
Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (copy on file at the Villanova Law
Review).
[VOL. 19 : p. 703
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In reaching its conclusion, the court relied in part on Edwards v.
California2 8 and Shapiro v. Thompson.29 The city had attempted to
defend its exclusionary measures on the ground that they were justified
by "compelling state interests" because (1) existing sewage facilities
were inadequate; (2) the existing water supply was insufficient; and
(3) the zoning power gave Petaluma "an inherent right to 'control
its own rate of growth.' "-
The court rejected all of the city's defenses. It dealt with the
claim of inadequate sewage treatment facilities by stating:
The sole issue in this case is whether or not people currently
excluded from Petaluma have the right to immigrate into the
area. If so, relief will be granted and their rights will be en-
forced; after which the matter of dealing with the natural bur-
dens that the exercise of those rights places upon the municipality
falls entirely within the discretion of city officials, or the city
electorate. Neither Petaluma city officials, nor the local electorate
may use their power to disapprove bonds at the polls as a weapon
to define or destroy fundamental constitutional rights.31
The city's claim that its water supply was insufficient received short
shrift :
Where a municipality purposefully limits the quantity of any
particular commodity available, then seeks to justify a population
limitation based upon an alleged inadequacy of that commodity,
it has not stated a compelling interest which supports the limitation.
Petaluma has so proceeded in the present case, and accordingly, it
has failed to offer a compelling state interest in this regard. 2
Petaluma's last line of defense, the sanctity of the zoning power, was
also rejected:
Defendants point out that virtually all zoning schemes limit
the manner in which people move about in one way or another.
In doing so, they contend, finally, and most frankly, that, by virtue
of its zoning power, the city has an inherent right to "control its
own rate of growth" and that its citizens' desires to protect its
"small town character" are sufficiently compelling reasons to
justify the exclusionary ordinances. This last defense assertion
states the essence of the matter and aptly defines the issue: may
28. 314 U.S. 160 (1941). In Edwards, a state statute prohibiting the transporta-
tion of indigent persons into the state was held unconstitutional as a barrier to inter-
state commerce. Id.
29. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In this case, a state statute denying welfare assistance
to residents of less than one year was held unconstitutional as a denial of equal protec-
tion. Id. The Court found that the statute inhibited the migration of indigents and that
it violated the constitutionally guaranteed right to interstate movement. Id. at 629-31.
30. 375 F. Supp. at 581-83.
31. Id. at 583.
32. Id.
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a municipality capable of supporting a natural population expan-
sion limit growth simply because it does not prefer to grow at the
rate which would be directed by prevailing market demand. It is
our opinion that it may not."8
In disposing of the zoning power argument, the court was careful to
narrow the issue. It was no more than "whether or not a municipality
may claim the specific rights to keep others away." '84 In concluding
that no municipality may restrict or bar the entry of new residents,
the court quoted with approval an especially persuasive passage from
the plaintiffs' brief:
This case is a study in anti-planning, the refusal of a city to come
to grips with the fact that it has joined a metropolitan complex
and is no longer the sleepy small town that it once was. In a
world in which nothing is as unchanging as change, Petaluma
wants to stay the same. The means to that end is to draw up
the bridge over the moat and turn people away. This is not the
use of police power, but the abdication of that power ....
In a large sense this case sets up the constitutional protec-
tions against a single small city's passing laws to keep people
away, to maintain "small town character" at the expense of de-
priving people of mobility, their right to travel, and of decent
housing or perhaps any housing at all ....
In a narrower sense, this case [holds] .. . that local police power
may [not] be used to shift -the burden of providing housing to
other cities in a metropolitan region which have their own police
power and their own problems. This issue .. . [questions] thejurisdiction of one town to visit its problems on another.
The prospective resident turned away at Petaluma does not dis-
appear into the hinterland, but presents himself in some other
suburb of the same metroplex, perhaps in some town with as
many problems or more than Petaluma . . . .By this means,
Petaluma legislates its problems into problems for Napa, Vallejo
or Walnut Creek.85
Thus, Petaluma drew clear lines between competing interests.
For those already residing in Petaluma, the need to limit growth in
order to control the rate at which the community changed must have
seemed to be sufficient justification for the exclusionary effect of the
Petaluma plan. To them the issue was whether the municipality would
control its own future. Set against these considerations was the con-
tinuous market demand for new housing which had to be satisfied
somehow, somewhere. Viewed from this perspective, the question
33. Id.
34. Id. at 587.35. Id., quoting Brief for Plaintiffs at 7-8.
[VOL. 19: p. 703
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became whether home buyers could be prevented from traveling to
and settling in Petaluma just because it 'had decided that it had had
enough housing construction for one year. If mobility is a fundamental
attribute of American citizenship, then there is no room for the use of
local police powers as a combination wall, moat, and drawbridge.
Petaluma purported to have acted in the general welfare, but its
concept of the general welfare was a narrowly circumscribed one that
only extended to the geographic boundaries of the town. The demo-
graphic demand for housing will not go away just because one com-
munity, or many, attempt to fence out new residents entirely or to
restrict their numbers by use of quotas. This effort only shifts the
burden elsewhere, and once the burden is shifted, other communities
will feel compelled to adopt their own exclusionary laws. Thus, one
exclusionary growth limitation will inevitably spawn similar restric-
tions in other communities as they scramble to shift the burden
of providing new housing for a mobile population to the last com-
munity to act. In the end, the exclusionary impact of one municipality's
limitations will 'be multiplied exponentially.
Florida Audubon Society36 underscores the great respect accorded
by the courts to what are essentially administrative decisions. Local
government has asked for, and quite commonly received, similar respect
for its particularized land use decisions in the form of the traditional
presumptions of validity and reasonableness. But as the environmental
considerations that affect land use decisions become more complex and
depend more upon the evaluation of the work of experts, these pre-
sumptions 'become anachronistic. We are fast approaching the time
when we will no longer be able to pretend that there is no need to
provide a method for reviewing, at some broader governmental level,
the wisdom of local land use decisions.
Growth control devices like the Ramapo and Petaluma plans
demonstrate that some land use decisions must be made for and by
governmental entities broader than those interested only in problems
occurring within the narrow confines of a single municipality. For
example, it is probably not meaningful to attempt to control growth
unless the demographic demand for housing is allocated throughout
the metropolitan region generating the demand. However, regional
approaches to land use controls require that the idea of the sanctity
of unfettered local authority over land use decisions be discarded.
There are no guarantees of environmental protection inherent in any
36. Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Callaway, Civil No. 73-824 (M.D. Fla., Jan. 29,
1974) (copy on file at the Villanova Law Review). See text accompanying note 1
supra.
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local allocation of authority. One municipality's decision to protect
its environment by forbidding development may only ensure a cumula-
tively greater environmental impact elsewhere.
Only new approaches to land use legislation which mandate in-
creasing involvement by state or regional land use agencies in major
planning decisions can assure that exclusionary land use controls will
not be able to masquerade as environmental concerns. One new ap-
proach would be the type of federal financial assistance to state land
use planning that was envisaged by the proposed Land Use Policy
and Planning Assistance Act of 1973. The Act would have provided
financial assistance for a state's land use planning process that would
have encompassed inventories of land and natural resources, and data
on population, economic and environmental conditions, and growth
trends, including projections of land needed and suitable for various
types of development. Within 5 years, participating states would have
been obliged to develop land use programs which, among other things,
would have had to provide methods for controlling large-scale de-
velopment as well as assuring that local regulations did not effect
the arbitrary exclusion of public facilities, utilities, or housing with
regional benefit.
The proposed Model Land Development Code 38 of the American
Law Institute provides a similar approach. It would confer on the
state planning agency the authority to designate areas of "critical state
concern" and to supersede or supplement local land use regulations
for these areas if such regulations did not meet state standards. In
the absence of local regulations, the regulatory power for areas of
critical state concern would rest with the state agency.39 Areas of
"critical state concern" would include "area[s] containing or having
a significant impact upon historical, natural or environmental resources
of regional or statewide importance . . . -"' These areas may include,
as the Reporters note, those which have a state or regional impact
because of the nature of a proposed development. 4' It is only a short
step from such concepts to a determination that a refusal to permit
development also has a regional impact.
The New York Court of Appeals was willing to credit the good
faith of Ramapo and indulge the presumption that the community
would accept its share of the market demand for housing at a pace it
37. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The House version is entitled Land Use
Planning Act of 1973, H.R. 10294, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
38. ALl MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1971).
39. Id. at §§ 7-201 to -208.
40. Id. at § 7-201(3) (b).
41. Id., Note at 11.
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could absorb, and the reasonableness of Ramapo's capital improvement
schedule was apparently not questioned. The Ramapo ordinance may
operate as a numerical limit no less than the Petaluma plan, but the
ordinance was neither so obvious nor so blatant. Moreover, the con-
cerns that moved the Petaluma court do not appear to have been raised
in Ramapo. It is too early to know whether the Petaluma decision will
be upheld, but for the moment the real roadblock appears to be the
constitutional barriers to exclusionary growth control ordinances raised
by that decision. If Petaluma is upheld, it will serve as a powerful in-
centive for more rational methods of making major land use decisions.
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